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Empty Time. The Temporality of Self-Affection 
in Kant’s Analytic of the Sublime
Louis Schreel
Introduction
For Kant, time is the structure of the processes through which we engage with things 
and the world around us. But outside of these relations, time is nothing. There is no 
deeper reality of time ‘in itself ’, in which all of our past experiences would be stored, 
so to speak. Less than reality itself, time is what makes our engagement with reality 
possible. We are not ‘in time’ as we are ‘in reality’, but time rather makes the struc-
tured appearance and engagement with reality possible. Without this structure, there 
would be no unity of consciousness throughout our perceptions, and our experience 
would be “nothing but a blind play of representations, i. e., less than a dream”.1 Time 
is thus not an object that can be observed. At most, we can try to observe and describe 
the structure of our dynamic engagements with reality. We can deduce the necessary 
conditions that make it possible for those engagements to lead to, for example, know-
ledge of the world. And having obtained those a priori conditions, it would be possi-
ble to think time as a pure form of intuition in general, with all de facto phenomenal 
givens stripped away. “In regard to appearances in general,” Kant writes, “one cannot 
remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time. […] The 
latter could all disappear, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibili-
ty) cannot be removed”.2 If we perform such an abstraction, we must conclude that 
time “has only one dimension: different times are not simultaneous, but successive”.3 
Space would then, on the contrary, be the a priori condition for givens to be intuited 
“outside and next to one another”.4 Time alone is the “a priori formal condition of all 
appearances in general”.5 Whereas inner givens are not subject to the spatial form of 
juxtaposition (which, temporally speaking, means simultaneity), all givens, both inner 
1  Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, transl. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge 1998, A112.
2  Ibid., A31, B46.
3  Ibid., B47.
4  Ibid., B38.
5  Ibid., A34.
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and outer, are subject to time’s form: succession. From this, it follows that time, as the 
succession imposed on “givens” for them to be given, “is nothing other than the form 
of inner sense, i. e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state”.6
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces the imagination as the synthetic 
faculty that constitutes time as the form of inner sense. Relative to the cognitive in-
terests of the understanding, the imagination synthesizes the progressive sequence of 
representations in time, thereby ‘preparing’ them for conceptual grasp. In the Analyt-
ic of the Sublime of the Critique of Judgment, however, the imagination is related to 
reason and is said to institute a ‘regression’ which annihilates the condition of time. 
Introducing the possibility of an aesthetic mode of comprehension, Kant proposes 
a function of the imagination that contrasts with its previously assigned functions: 
The imaginative regression allows the spectator of sublime states of affairs or events 
to comprehend as a simultaneous whole what is normally apprehended as temporally 
discrete. Instead of progressively constituting time as the form of inner sense through 
synthesis, the regression is said to be “a subjective movement of the imagination by 
which it does violence to inner sense.”7 Nonetheless, the spectator does not lose all 
phenomenal stability; she does not sink away in “a blind play of representations, i. e., 
less than a dream”.8  The suspension of time in sublime feeling does not annihilate 
time as such but produces what Jean-François Lyotard calls an “exit from inner sense”.9 
In sublime feeling, both our imagination and our power of reasoning experience a 
form of “empty time” (“rien de temps”) that creates a feeling of non-coincidence with 
ourselves. Lyotard specifies that this exit from inner sense consists, in fact, of two 
moments: On the one hand, he discerns a “weakening” of time (“extenuation”) due to 
the regress of the imagination and, on the other hand, an “extemporalization” (“ex-
temporalisation”) due to the presence of an idea of reason. Given the complexity of 
both accounts, and the limited space at our disposal here, we will focus only on the 
first moment, that of the regress of the imagination. We will examine (1) how Kant’s 
6  Ibid., B49.
7  Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, transl. by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, Cambridge 2000, AA259.
8  Kant, Reason (see note 1), A112.
9  Lyotard, Jean-François, Leçons sur l’Analytique du sublime, Paris 1991, p. 179; Lyotard, Jean-François, Lessons on the 
Analytic of the Sublime, transl. by Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford 1994, p. 145.
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account of the imaginative regression in sublime feeling relates to his earlier theory of 
the imagination given in the first Critique and (2) how Lyotard interprets the former 
as an exit from inner sense.
Time as Self-Affection
In the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant uses the term 
‘aesthetic’ to designate the sensory reception of matter, which is structured by the 
forms of intuition in space and time. As noted, Kant determines the latter, space and 
time, as the a priori forms of intuition, which are to be distinguished from empirical 
presentations or from a posteriori contents (for example, the colour black). In them-
selves, space and time are but the “empty” forms through which phenomena can be 
apperceived. In the Transcendental Deduction, this complex understanding of time 
and space as the pure, a priori forms of experience is further elaborated. Kant explains 
that for the manifold of sensations that arrives to us through our receptive faculty of 
sensibility to have any order or unity, it is required that we apply determinations to it. 
For example, when viewing a dog, Febo, we might see a sweet gaze, hear a soft groan, 
and feel a wet tongue; but in Kant’s view, there is nothing about these sensations ‘in 
themselves’ that suggests we should associate them in a meaningful sort of way. In 
Kant’s words, “the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold”10 can never come to us 
‘directly’ through the senses. Rather, the experience is dependent upon the faculty of 
the understanding and the way in which its concepts – for example ‘dog’ – are applied 
to the manifold of sensations. To account for this construction of the spatiotemporal, 
integrative flux of phenomenal experience, Kant distinguishes three basic synthetic 
operations that transform sensory data into a meaningful, coherent experience: ap-
prehension, reproduction, and recognition.11 Together, these time syntheses enable 
the subject to integrate and represent sensible diversity so as to form a properly spa-
tiotemporal object capable of being subsumed under concepts of the understanding 
and thereby of being cognized as experience. The empirical exercise of sensibility (1) 
apprehends representations given in intuition one instant to the next. The reproducti-
ve imagination (2) gathers the passing apprehensions and the productive imagination 
10  Kant, Reason (see note 1), B129.
11  Ibid., A98–110, B141, B150–152.
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synthesizes them together in such a way that the given flux of data is prepared for the 
conceptual grasp (3) of the understanding. For the model of recognition – the under-
standing recognizing the synthesized intuitive manifold by means of its concepts – to 
function properly, all the faculties must envision the ‘same’ object and the exercise of 
the faculties must remain ‘limited’ to its contribution to the process of recognition. 
The object of sensibility, of recollection, of the imagination, and eventually of thought 
is, for the representation, identical.
When encountering Febo, for example, we first apprehend this “manifold’s parts” 
little by little. For the gaze, groan and tongue to possess a meaningful relationship 
to one another, the reproductive imagination must retain these tiny and otherwise 
fleeting apprehensions while the productive imagination must reproduce them as a 
‘combination’ into an image of a dog. The imagination performs this reconstruction 
in accordance with the concept of ‘dog’, which indicates a rule (a “schematism”12) 
according to which it can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in general. 
Nothing in sensibility or in imagination accounts for that operation by which we go 
from ‘gaze-groan-tongue’ to the concept of a ‘dog-object,’ of which we could predicate 
each of these qualities. It is, instead, our faculty of ‘understanding’ that manifests the 
capacity to relate a combined manifold of sensations to a single ‘object’ through the 
act of ‘recognition’. For this recognition to be possible, we need an empty concept of 
an object, a ‘placeholder’ object, to which we can relate the combination of sensory 
data. Kant calls this the ‘object=x’: it is not the object that is given to us in experi-
ence, Febo, but is instead the necessary condition under which the experience of the 
object ‘can be given’. The ‘object=x’ is an elementary determination of the object, as 
an ‘any-object-whatsoever’, that must be in place in order for any other conceptual 
determinations of the object to be applied.13
12  Ibid., A141, B180.
13  Kant, Reason (see note 1), A103–106.
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This ‘object=x’ is in fact what enables a connection between the spatiotemporal 
operations of sensibility and imagination and the understanding’s conceptual deter-
minations, resulting in the experience of an object with both conceptual and sensi-
ble content. This mediating role of the imagination is elementary because there is a 
‘tension’ between the temporal flux and the conceptual unification. As Corry Shores 
writes in an instructive article:
The moments of apprehension, although temporally exclusive to one another, are taken together si-
multaneously in the reproductive imagination. There must somehow be a unified consciousness that 
is the same throughout the moments, for otherwise they would belong to a different consciousness 
and thus be unavailable for synthesis.14
This unified consciousness is for Kant not a ‘product’ of the syntheses of the imagi-
nation, but a precondition for these syntheses themselves to be possible. Indeed, for 
Kant, the very possibility of synthesizing different moments of empirical conscious-
ness requires that I am able to regard the latter as all belonging to ‘me’ – even if I 
do not always consciously do so.15 Behind each empirical consciousness, there must 
therefore lie a “transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness”.16 This a priori 
unified self-consciousness is the ‘transcendental apperception’, or the ‘I think’, which 
accompanies all of our conceptual acts.17 The latter must be distinguished from the 
‘empirical apperception’ or ‘inner sense’, which is our self-consciousness under a stream 
of alterations.18 Empirical self-consciousness is not enough to allow us to apprehend 
ourselves as enduring persons because it is plunged in time as a flow of succession. In 
this flow of inner sense, we are aware of ourselves as contingent objects in the world, as 
passive, receptive beings that are ever inconsistent and disunited. The means to make 
all our empirical variations belong together and relate to the identity of the subject 
14  Corry Shores, Self Shock. The Phenomenon of Personal Non-Identity in Inorganic Subjectivity, in: The Yearbook on 
History and Interpretation of Phenomenology 2013, Frankfurt 2013, p. 177.
15  Kant, Reason (see note 1), A155, B194: “The synthesis of representations rests on the imagination, but their syn-
thetic unity (which is requisite for judgment), on the unity of apperception.” This basic claim of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, namely that no connected whole representation can have an objective unity without a concept provided by the 
understanding, is reinforced by the second edition of the first Critique, where Kant drops the Transcendental Deduction 
with its three syntheses and starts the new Deduction by directly affirming the fundamental role of the understanding 
and its categories for all synthesis.
16  Ibid., A106, A117 (note).
17  Ibid., B131–132.
18  Kant, Reason (see note 1), A107.
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come from the transcendental apperception, which itself somehow falls outside the 
flow of time and is “unchanging”.19 Yet, the latter cannot alone apprehend itself or 
cognize itself, because it has of itself no intuitive content. As Shores writes:
In order to do this, it [the transcendental apperception] needs to synthesize itself into a manifold of the 
phenomenal self-appearings happening at temporally distinct moments. In other words, the conscious-
ness of our unified non-temporal subjectivity, in order to become explicitly aware of itself, needs to 
manifest itself as being disunified through time.20
Accordingly, we must distinguish two different ways in which the imagination tempo-
ralizes: empirically and transcendentally.21 Empirically, it connects (through the syn-
theses of apprehension and reproduction) a perception with all previous experiences 
and thereby produces a unified picture, an image. An example of such an enriched 
experience is the appearance of snow, which, through the filter of the imagination, 
‘looks’ cold even when we do not come near it.22 But the imagination also has ano-
ther transcendental function by which it creates a temporal-spatial field in which a 
perception can appear. The process of temporalization means, here, that the imagina-
tion ‘detaches’ the object from live experience, from the sensory present, and that it 
places it under the concrete universality of time.23 This detachment from the present 
moment in which I remain immersed in things is an act of interiorization, which is 
expressed by the ‘re-‘ of ‘representation’, just as the ‘con-‘ of contemplation expresses 
the possibility of a survey and a simultaneity, which evokes space.
Thus, there is a clear division in the subject between two different and unbridgeable 
self-consciousnesses: empirical apperception, which is tied to the contingent, uncon-
trolled vagrancies of sense experience and empirical imagination; and transcendental 
apperception, which designates my self-determining abilities. Kant develops this di-
vision in the subject along the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer sense’. Whereas 
19  Ibid., A107.
20  Shores, Shock (see note 14), p. 178.
21  Kant, Reason (see note 1), A100–102.
22  This example is taken from Louis Dupré, Aesthetic Perception and its Relation to Ordinary Perception, in: Aisthesis 
and Aesthetics. The Fourth Lexington Conference on Pure and Applied Phenomenology, ed. by Erwin W. Straus and Richard 
M. Griffith, Pittsburgh 1970, p. 172.
23  Mikel Dufrenne, Phénoménologie de l’expérience esthétique, vol. 2, Paris 1993, p. 434. Cited in: Dupré, Perception 
(see note 8), p. 172.
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external objects modify our outer sense, “self-affections” modify our inner sense.24 
Under the name of the transcendental synthesis of imagination, the understanding 
exercises an activity upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is. Inner sense is nothing 
but the affection of this action. It is our awareness of ourselves as not merely passive, 
causally determined beings or objects in the world, but as also intentional, actively de-
termining beings, i. e. subjects, for the world. Kant gives an example of self-affection: 
our acts of attention.25 When we focus our attention on our dog, Febo, we notice a 
modification in our awareness, as it is becoming more focused. This results not from 
the external object itself but from an internal influence: “In such acts the understand-
ing always determines the inner sense, in accordance with the combination that it 
thinks, to the inner intuition that corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the 
understanding.”26 Thus, as Shores concludes, “It [attention] gives us a representation 
of our active subjectivity as a self-affecting subject, but it appears only phenomenally 
as a passively modified empirical self-consciousness.”27
We can summarize by saying that in the Critique of Pure Reason the imagination 
serves to order a manifold of sense, which it cannot comprehend directly as a whole. 
It is bound by a progressive form of time – a linear sequence, which moves on inces-
santly. Concepts of the understanding are necessary to go beyond the successive and 
ephemeral nature of inner sense and to comprehend coexistence in space. With these 
distinctions we can now turn to Kant’s differentiation between cognitive conscious-
ness and aesthetic consciousness.
The Indeterminacy of Aesthetic Temporality
In the Critique of Judgment, the meaning of the term ‘aesthetic’ changes profoundly, 
from the study of the pure a priori forms of sensibility to the analysis of judgments of 
the beautiful and the sublime. Now, ‘aesthetic’ means no longer the grasp of the givens 
of sensible intuition in a priori forms of space and time but reflective judgment, inso-
far as it excites the interest of the ‘faculty of the soul’ that is the feeling of pleasure or 
24  Kant, Reason (see note 1), B153–156.
25  Ibid., B156.
26  Ibid., B157.
27  Shores, Shock (see note 14), p. 178.
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displeasure. Thus, the term ‘sensation’ as the ‘determination of the feeling of pleasure 
or displeasure’ is given an entirely different meaning than in the first Critique, where 
the sensation is ‘the representation of a thing’. While in the latter sense sensation is 
a necessary ‘building’ block of the conditions of possibility for objective knowledge 
in general, in the analytic of taste, sensation no longer has any cognitive finality. It 
no longer gives any information about an object but only about the ‘subject’ itself.
This ‘subject’ is no longer the transcendental apperception or ‘I think’ which ac-
companies all of our conceptual acts. The feeling accompanying our act of thinking 
and informing us about our state of mind, our ‘Gemütszustand’, is not the self-affection 
of the first Critique. In the third Critique, ‘reflection’ is determined as the state of the 
faculty of judging when “only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be 
found”.28 Reflective judgment concerns itself with objects only in their particularity, 
as they are given at this singular moment, and not as they are subjected to the a priori 
rules of the understanding. In this sense, the sensations of beauty and sublimity are 
tied to that which is essentially contingent, which does not let itself be anticipated 
and only lets itself be sensed in the process of a veritable encounter. Reflective judg-
ment judges objects as if the rules that determined their possibility a priori were not 
sufficient to account for their particularity. As we have seen, relative to the cognitive 
interests of the understanding, the imagination’s most important function is to pro-
duce schemata that make possible the application of universal concepts to particulars 
of sense. In reflective judgment, however, intuitions are related and compared without 
any conceptual synthesis.
Each act of thinking is always accompanied by a feeling that signals to thought its 
‘state’. In other words, sensation is always there every time there is an act of thought, 
what Kant calls ‘knowledge’ or ‘representation’. And, as we have seen in the previous 
section, “as contained in one moment [in einem Augenblick enthalten] no representa-
tion can ever be anything other [niemals etwas anderes] than absolute unity [als absolute 
28  Kant, Judgment (see note 7), AA179. The first Critique introduces the term in the Appendix to the Analytic of Prin-
ciples entitled “On the amphiboly of concepts of reflection.” Here, Kant calls reflection, Überlegung (reflexio), “the state 
of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out [ausfindig zu machen] the subjective conditions under which we 
can arrive at concepts”; cf. Kant, Reason (see note 1), B316.
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Einheit]”.29 Therefore, the question is how we become conscious of the agreement of the 
faculties of knowledge,: whether it is by sensation or ‘intellectually’. Kant addresses this 
question in the ninth paragraph of the third Critique, where he introduces sensation:
If the given representation, which occasions the judgment of taste, were a concept, which united un-
derstanding and imagination in the judging [Beurtheilung] of the object into a cognition of the ob-
ject, then the consciousness of this relationship would be intellectual (as in the objective schematism 
of the power of judgment, which was dealt with in the [first] critique). But in that case the judgment 
would not be made in relation to pleasure and displeasure, hence it would not be a judgment of taste. 
Now the judgment of taste, however, determines the object, independently of concepts, with regard 
to satisfaction and the predicate of beauty. Thus that subjective unity of the relation can make itself 
known [kenntlich machen] only through sensation.30
The Analytic of the Beautiful shows that in judgments of taste the imagination can 
apprehend “the form of an object of intuition without a relation of this to a concept 
for a determinate cognition”.31 This apprehension of form is subjectively purposive in 
producing a pure aesthetic pleasure consisting of a feeling of harmonious play between 
the imagination and the understanding. Just as the schema unites the two faculties, 
imagination and understanding, in order to make knowledge of an object possible, 
so sensation is the sign of their union (pleasure) or of their disunion (displeasure), 
on the occasion of an object and on the side of thought. Yet, whereas in the case of 
knowledge there is a determinate relation where a specific intuition is subsumed un-
der a specific concept to provide knowledge, the felt harmony between imagination 
and understanding is an ‘indeterminate’ relation between two faculties in general.
The temporality inherent to the feeling of the beautiful is addressed briefly in the 
“Third Moment” of the Analytic of the Beautiful. The two central characteristics of 
cognitive time, which allowed the first Critique to deduce the ‘I think’ – succession 
and the affection of the self by itself – are here suspended. Essential for aesthetic plea-
sure is that it “lingers” (“weilen”) to “maintain” (“in demselben zu erhalten”) the state of 
mind.32 The Verweilung, the way we “linger” – a lingering that the play of the faculties 
imposes on thinking that judges aesthetically – puts thought into a state ‘analogous’ to 
the passivity  it feels (“wobei das Gemüt passiv ist”) when it is attracted to an object.33 
29  Kant, Reason (see note 1), A99.
30  Kant, Judgment (see note 7), AA219, B30.
31  Ibid., AA189.




Yet, whereas the attraction paralyzes the faculties, for example in the case of fascina-
tion, the beautiful throws them into a play. This reduction of the ‘subjective’ to a state 
of passivity makes the ‘I think’ forget itself as the thought of the object turned toward 
experience by means of the forms of coexistence (space) and succession (time). Lyotard 
describes the time of aesthetic lingering as a kind of “pause of diachronic time”: “the 
sensation provided by the free play of the faculties institutes a manner of being for 
time that cannot involve an inner sense.”34
The imagination enters into a “free play” with the understanding, although the rules 
of the latter remain in effect. The imagination, operating aesthetically, is productive, 
‘creative’ and not only ‘reproductive’, as it had to be for the purposes of theoretical 
knowledge. It takes liberties with the postulates of empirical thought in general and 
in particular with the analogies of experience, which are permanence, succession, and 
coexistence – in short, with everything that Kant refers to as ‘the law of association’, 
which belongs to the empirical employment of the imagination. The imagination is 
granted its own spontaneous activity in judging and producing beautiful forms but 
does not have its own laws. Artistic imagination may not violate the categorical frame-
work provided by the understanding, as that would result in metaphysical speculation 
or transcendental illusion. It may, however, explicate, by means of analogy, possibili-
ties left open by that framework. Drawing on the objects of experience, the imagina-
tion remodels the latter and presents an object that is not present in it. It presents, in 
Kant’s terms, “aesthetic Ideas”, which are representations of objects such that there is 
no corresponding property in the ‘concept’ of this object.35 The aesthetic idea is the 
presentation of an ‘object’ that escapes the concept of this object; it is an intuition (of 
the imagination) for which a concept can never be found adequate. It presents what 
Kant calls the “unnameable” (“das Unnennbare”)36, which “stimulates so much think-
ing”37, “though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i. e., concept, 
to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make in-
34  Lyotard, Leçons (see note 9), p. 85; Lyotard, Lessons (see note 9), p. 64. For the temporal structure of judgments 
of taste, cf. pp. 34–41; pp. 19–26.
35  Kant, Judgment (see note 7), AA342.
36  Ibid., AA316.
37  Ibid., AA315.
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telligible.”38 As Lyotard puts it: “A storm of Ideas suspends ordinary time in order to 
perpetuate itself.”39 The object thus produced by the imagination escapes not only its 
identification by understanding but ‘recognition’ in the strongest sense that the De-
duction of pure concepts gives to this term in the first Critique.”40 “In the strongest 
sense,” writes Lyotard, because it is a matter not of “mere” recognition, but of noth-
ing less than the constitution of the ‘inner sense’, that is, of the time implicated in all 
knowledge. Thus, as a result of the productive imagination in taste, a proliferation of 
representations is grafted upon a single given such that the conceptual consciousness 
that is supposed to make these representations ‘recognizable’, that is, to situate them 
in one singular series of apprehensions of reproductions of the manifold, is missing.
In the Analytic of the Sublime, Kant considers the imagination in relation to reason 
instead of understanding. The sublime feeling results from “the effort of the imagina-
tion to treat nature as a schema” for the ideas of reason.41 Whereas the understanding 
is the faculty of finite knowledge, reason strives to comprehend the infinite. In the 
sublime ‘state’, thought gets carried away: The imagination is forced by reason to do 
violence to itself in order to present that which it cannot present, and reason seeks, 
unreasonably, to violate the critical interdict it imposes on itself and to find objects 
corresponding to its concepts in sensible intuition. In both of these aspects, thinking 
defies its own finitude and is, to use Lyotard’s words, “fascinated by its own excessive-
ness.”42 In the sublime state of mind, thinking feels a “desire for limitlessness.”43 Al-
though it is all too obvious within the critical framework that this desire is relegated 
to inevitable illusion, to insanity even (the “delirium” [“Wahnsinn”] of enthusiasm, 
denying it of any moral value44), Kant’s account of the imagination calls for a recon-
sideration of its relation to time.
In sublime feeling, the imagination will no longer appear as the synthetic origin 
of time, but a conflict (“Widerstreit”, “différend”) will rather arise between time and 
38  Ibid., AA314.
39  Lyotard, Leçons (see note 9), p. 88; Lyotard, Lessons (see note 9), p. 67.
40  Ibid., p. 96; p. 74.
41  Kant, Judgment (see note 7), AA265.
42  Lyotard, Leçons (see note 9), p. 75; Lyotard, Lessons (see note 9), p. 55.
43  Ibid.
44  Kant, Judgment (see note 7), B126.
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the imagination. In an unexpected reversal of its normal operation, the imagination 
institutes a ‘regress’, which suspends the progressive sequence of inner sense and makes 
possible the intuition of coexistence, an ‘aesthetic’ comprehension independent of the 
understanding. Kant describes this in the following key passage:
The measurement of a space (as apprehension) is at the same time the description of it, thus an ob-
jective movement in the imagination and a progression; by contrast, the comprehension of multipli-
city [Vielheit] in the unity not of thought but of intuition, hence the comprehension in one moment 
[Augenblick] of that which is successively apprehended, is a regression, which in turn cancels [aufhebt] 
the time-condition in the progression of the imagination and makes simultaneity intuitable. It is thus 
(since the temporal succession is a condition of inner sense and of an intuition) a subjective movement 
of the imagination, by which it does violence to the inner sense.45
The same synthesis that the first Critique designated as the origin of time seems here 
to be determined, nonetheless, as a violence imposed on time.46 The idea of a conflict 
between the imagination and time, of a regress ‘annihilating’ the “time-condition” 
seems entirely contradictory to the idea defended in the first Critique. Here, as we have 
seen, the imagination played the crucial mediating role of producing schemata that 
make possible the application of universal concepts to particulars of sense – an appli-
cation without which there could be no comprehension whatsoever. The productive 
imagination performed a transcendental synthesis by schematizing all the categories 
in terms of time – the form of inner sense. By translating the rules implicit in the ca-
tegories into a temporally ordered set of instructions, it made possible the construc-
tion of an objectively determinate nature. Aesthetic judgment, as a form of reflective 
judgment, may not require the temporal determinacy in the way that it is necessary 
for cognitive consciousness, but this does not account for the more radical claim that 
the imagination violates inner sense and annihilates the condition of time. How then 
should we understand the violence done to time in relation to the claim of the first 
Critique that time cannot be annihilated as such? In Lyotard’s reading, the regress of 
the imagination does not mean an annihilation of time as such, but it rather suggests 
the possibility of negating the mathematical or linear form of time.
45  Ibid., AA258–259.
46  In an essay on the theme of a “transcendental violence” imposed upon time, Jacob Rogozinski points to the impor-
tance of Jacques Derrida’s “Violence et métaphysique”, which was published in L’écriture et la différence (Paris 1967); cf. 
Jacob Rogozinski, Le don du monde, in: Du sublime, ed. by Michel Deguy, Paris 1988, pp. 179–210.
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The Regression of the Imagination
As noted, aesthetic judgment as a mode of reflective judgment does not require the 
numerical progression of time, which is based on the spatial analogy of a measurable 
line. This linearly ordered time required for the progressive apprehension and mathe-
matical determination of nature as extensive magnitude is built upon the synthesis 
of the manifold, that is, through what Kant calls “composition (Zusammensetzung) 
of the homogeneous manifold”.47 In the latter, in the successive composition of units 
requisite for the representation of magnitudes, “the imagination, by itself, without 
anything hindering it, advances to infinity […], the understanding, however, guides 
this [leitet sie] by numerical concepts, for which the former must provide the schema”.48 
This composition is in fact nothing other than the apprehension and reproduction 
necessary to the constitution of the time of knowledge (and of space secondarily) but 
applied to the constitution of objects of knowledge according to their extensive ma-
gnitude. In this composition, the imagination lets itself be ‘guided’ by the concept, 
which is in short the ‘consciousness’ of the unity produced by the imagination’s syn-
thesis. However, as long as this (logical) estimation of magnitude is subordinated to 
the ‘concept of an end’, namely cognitive determination, it cannot be aesthetic. As 
long as the understanding provides the logical comprehension, a ‘limit’ experience, 
such as that of the sublime, remains impossible.
In the logical comprehension of quantity, the understanding measures the dimen-
sions of the object by means of relative quantities. However, for this arithmetic calcu-
lation not to remain abstract and empty of sense, it requires the support of a “primary 
measure”49, which is an aesthetic evaluation of size and distance, where we take the 
measure of the given “in a single glance” (“in einem Augenblick”). This evaluation “in 
mere intuition” (“nach dem Augenmaße”) tells us, without the need of comparison 
with other things, that the given is a quantum. But it does not yet tell us how ‘great’ 
something is, for then the question is not to apprehend it as quantum but to measure 
its quantity, its quantitas, which requires a “numerical formula” that works a posteriori 
on the given object. As Lyotard explains:
47  Kant, Reason (see note 1), B203.
48  Kant, Judgment (see note 7), AA253.
49  Kant, Judgment (see note 7), AA251.
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Quantity is not magnitude, but the number of times the same unit is contained in the extensive mag-
nitude. It must be measured in relation to a unit, that is, by comparing it to another magnitude taken 
as a unit of measure. This unit is in turn chosen after being compared with other magnitudes. Unlike 
the quantum, the quantitas is thus not provided with an a priori synthesis in intuition.50
The sublime is said to be “that which is absolutely great”.51 Since it is ‘absolute’ without 
possible comparison, it is not measurable as a quantity.52 If the evaluation of quantity 
or greatness were ‘merely’ mathematical, an experience of the sublime would, therefo-
re, be impossible. It is only at the pre-logical, pre-objective level, “in its naïve embrace 
of the world”53, that the finite, essentially limited comprehension of the imagination 
can encounter its maximum, the sublime limit on which it breaks.
The aesthetic comprehension instantiated by the regression of the imagination 
is a comprehension ‘in one moment’ not of a ‘manifold’ (Mannigfaltigheit), but of a 
‘multiplicity’ (Vielheit). Although Kant does not elaborate on this distinction in the 
passage on the imaginative regress, it provides an important tool for understanding this 
specific mode of intuition. It indicates, as Rudolf Makkreel has shown in an instructive 
reading of the “Imagination and temporality in Kant’s theory of the sublime”54, that 
“the plurality-unity relation in aesthetic comprehension differs from that in logical 
comprehension.”55 Makkreel notes that the distinction between Vielheit and Mannig-
faltigheit is lost in the standard English Bernard and Meredith translations of the third 
Critique where both terms have been rendered as ‘manifold’, thereby giving the mis-
leading impression that the imaginative regression is dealing with the ‘comprehension 
50  Lyotard, Leçons (see note 9), pp. 104–105; Lyotard, Lessons (see note 9), p. 80. Lyotard also points to an important 
conceptual confusion due to a wrong correction of Erdmann in Kant’s original German text. In Kant, Reason (see note 
1), A252 we read: “For when apprehension has gone so far that the partial representations of the intuition of the senses 
that were apprehended first already begin to fade in the imagination as the latter proceeds on to the apprehension of 
further ones, then it loses on one side as much as it gains on the other, and there is in the comprehension a greatest point 
beyond which it cannot go.” The latter, “comprehension” (“Zusammenfassung”) is not the concept used by Kant in the 
original German text, but a correction made by Erdmann. Kant had written “Zusammensetzung”, “composition”. On this 
confusion and its consequences, cf. Lyotard, Leçons (see note 9), p. 130–137; Lyotard, Lessons (see note 9), p. 102–109.
51  Kant, Judgment (see note 7), AA248.
52  Kant introduces the term “magnitudo” in opposition to “quantity”, which cannot be absolute; cf. ibid.
53  Rogozinski, Don (see note 46), p. 202.
54  Rudolf Makkreel, Imagination and Temporality in Kant’s Theory of the Sublime, in: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, vol. 42, no. 3 (1984), pp. 303–315.
55  Makkreel, Imagination (see note 54), p. 308.
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of the manifold’ reserved for the conceptual synthesis of the understanding. However, 
the imaginative regression is dealing with the comprehension of a multiplicity as a 
unity, not with the successive composition of units. Whereas, for the logical compre-
hension, the content of sense is regarded as a manifold, i. e. a complex of temporally 
determined parts, “in aesthetic comprehension, by contrast, the content of sense is 
regarded as a multiplicity of indeterminate parts of a whole.”56 While the unity of 
the former must be inferred through a concept and involves an objective progress of 
the imagination, the unity of the latter can be instantaneously comprehended in the 
subjective regress of the imagination.
The distinction between Vielheit and Mannigfaltigkeit goes back to the distinc-
tion between extensive and intensive magnitudes, made in the Anticipations of Per-
ception of the first Critique.57 An extensive magnitude involves a manifold generated 
by a successive synthesis proceeding from parts to a whole. By contrast, an intensive 
magnitude is not apprehended successively but in an instant. The intensive magni-
tude, which Kant calls a degree (“Grad”), represents the multiplicity in the content 
of sense. It is the quantum corresponding to “the matter of sensation” or “the real of 
the sensation […] by which one can only be conscious that the subject is affected”.58 
Kant writes: “Now I call that magnitude which can only be apprehended as unity, 
and in which multiplicity (Vielheit) can only be represented through approximation 
to negation=0, intensive magnitude.”59 Makkreel refers to H. J. Paton’s interpretation 
of this obscure passage:
56  Ibid.
57  The Anticipations of Perception are one of the four Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding. These principles 
are the a priori rules that understanding observes in constituting not experience in general but the objects of experience 
or in experience. The principles regulate the relation of understanding to inner sense, which, as we have seen, is time, or 
the universal form of intuition; cf. Lyotard, Leçons (see note 9), pp. 116–118; Lyotard, Lessons (see note 9), pp. 90–92.
58  Kant, Reason (see note 1), B207, emphasis by the author.
59  Ibid., B210.
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The multiplicity in an intensive magnitude is not represented by parts outside one another. Instead, 
“every degree contains a plurality, because it contains all lesser degrees down to zero.”60 The multipli-
city involved is not of discriminated parts of a manifold, but of degrees of intensity. This multiplicity 
in unity is given in an instant: yet, apparently, it can be represented as a multiplicity only when we 
imagine a possible diminution of the sensation. Such an imaginative act would require a process in 
time, and is not easily squared with Kant’s assertion that apprehension of intensive magnitude is ins-
tantaneous. This difficulty is part of a more general one posed by the Anticipations of Perception. […] 
Certainly in the context of the first Critique, the idea of an instantaneous synthesis through which we 
intuit multiplicity remains problematic at best.61
Without further pursuing the intrinsic difficulties of the Anticipations here, we will 
only indicate how Makkreel sees in the imaginative regress of the third Critique a 
‘more readily conceivable’ intuition of multiplicity that will help us to grasp in what 
sense the sublime involves an ‘exit from inner sense’, as Lyotard puts it in the Lessons. 
From the point of view of the first Critique, an instant is never sufficient to allow us 
to apprehend the manifold contained in a given intuition, for it requires temporal 
discrimination. The manifold contained in an intuition can only be represented by 
the mind as a manifold if it has the time to do so, that is, if it can distinguish time in 
the sequence of one impression upon another. Since, in the aesthetic comprehension, 
unlike in the logical one, the content of sense is regarded as a multiplicity of ‘indeter-
minate’ parts of a whole, the unity of the comprehension does not have to be inferred 
through a concept and does therefore not require an objective progress of the imagi-
nation. Much rather, from the point of view of the third Critique, “the intuition of 
multiplicity is more readily conceivable through the idea of a imagination annulling 
the linear form of time.”62 “Thus,” Makkreel concludes, “aesthetic comprehension 
intuits multiplicity as an indeterminate unity, which is to be conceived as a totality 
or continuum without discrete parts.”63
In this sense, as Lyotard remarks, “the sublime thing [la chose sublime] is not ex-
actly a phenomenon.”64 The sublime, for Kant, is not a quality of the object. Rather, 
it is an experience, which is not yet ‘covered’, one might say, with extensiveness and 
60  H. J. Paton, Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience II, London 1965, p. 136, note 1. Cited in: Makkreel, Imagination (see 
note 21), p. 309.
61  Makkreel, Imagination (see note 54), p. 309.
62  Ibid.
63  Ibid.
64  Lyotard, Leçons (see note 9), p. 106; Lyotard, Lessons (see note 9), p. 81.
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qualities, as in the empirical exercise of the imagination. The state of mind that expe-
riences sublimity is provoked by an intensive sensory impression that does not serve 
here as an anticipation of perception, but that ‘directs’ it at the ‘supersensible’, deter-
mined by Kant as the ‘idea’ that ‘transcends’ all sensibility and even as the sensibility 
transformed by the imagination. Imagination’s regression to reason, annihilating time 
as produced by the transcendental imagination of the first Critique and transcending 
all empirical sensibility, is, however, as such not so much transcendent, but can be 
seen to have a transcendental character itself.65 That is to say, instead of extending the 
imagination beyond its limits, it provides the occasion to recognize them.
Conclusion
Whereas the first Critique presupposes the possibility of knowledge and, accordingly, 
the transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness, the third Critique raises the 
question of this possibility. In the Analytic of the Sublime, Kant meditates on the pos-
sibility of an involuntary spasm that breaks the solid assemblage of representations 
in their temporal sequence and results in a kind of incapacity to maintain the unity 
of the consciousness of these representations in the change of their succession. The 
convulsion in which the before and after lose their maintenance does, however, not 
lead to a total abolishment of phenomenal stability. The sublime is not, to use the 
terms of the first Critique, “nothing but a blind play of representations, i. e., less than 
a dream”.66  The unchained ocean and distorted storms of nature awaken this threat, 
which is the insistence of chaos, without leading to absolute formlessness and paraly-
sis of our faculties. As Kant writes: “The mind feels itself moved in the representation 
of the sublime in nature”.67 This sublime movement “may be compared to a vibrati-
on, i. e., to a rapidly alternating repulsion from and attraction to one and the same 
object.”68 The imagination, driven in apprehension to what is ‘repellent’ for sensibi-
lity (imagination’s “abyss”69), is however still attracted by reason. Through the very 
65  Lyotard illustrates this by comparing the imaginative regress to the cosmological regress of traditional metaphysics, 
which Kant discusses in the Antinomy of Pure Reason of the first Critique; cf. ibid., pp. 162–169; pp. 131–137.
66  Kant, Reason (see note 1), A112.
67  Kant, Judgment (see note 7), AA158.
68  Ibid., AA258.
69  Ibid., AA265.
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impotency of the imagination, the destination of the mind, namely its receptivity to 
ideas (which is superior to each exemplification) is signalled. In this way, the subli-
me is said to be an indirect pleasure, a delight generated by “a momentary inhibition 
[Hemmung] of the vital powers and the immediately following and all the more po-
werful outpouring [Ergießung] of them”.70
Sublime feeling, as a form of self-affection, designates from the perspective of the 
first Critique a disturbance of the transcendental level, which threatens the subject 
in its most minimal power, namely thought’s ability of synthesizing givens (its own 
included). The aesthetic comprehension in ‘one glance’ of what is successive does ‘vi-
olence’ not only to the a priori condition of the intuition of any given or succession, 
but to the eminent and unique condition that such a grasp imposes on the intuition 
of ourselves and of our state. The subject, for a moment at least – namely, at least for 
the duration of the Zugleich of the regression –, is deprived of the means of consti-
tuting its subjectivity. The sublime, in Lyotard’s words, “for a moment threatens the 
subject to make him disappear.”71 The spectator, for a moment, is thrown back into 
the uncontrolled nature of her receptivity. The synthesis of the given becomes impos-
sible, and the quality of the state, in which the thought that imagines finds itself, is 
reversed: It is afraid of this Überschwengliche, of this transcendent, this movable and 
confused (schwingen) beyond (über), “like an abyss [Abgrund] in which it fears to lose 
itself ”.”72 This affection does not primarily concern the empirical individual, but must 
be seen as a transcendental affection. What happens is more serious than an obstacle 
to the Zusammenfassung of a magnitude, the presentation of an object in intuition. 
It is the destruction of the very condition of self-affection, namely the temporality 
proper to all presentation. We encounter a moment of temporal simultaneity emptied 
of all phenomenal determinability, which is the first condition of the possibility for 
the human experience of the sublime:
In Kant, passibility does not disappear with the sublime but becomes a passibility to lack [une passibilité 
au manque]. It is precisely the beautiful forms with their destination, our own destiny, which are missing, 
and the sublime includes this sort of pain due to the finitude of ‘flesh’, this ontological melancholy.73
70  Ibid., AA245.
71  Lyotard, Leçons (see note 9), p. 177; Lyotard, Lessons (see note 9), p. 144.
72  Ibid., p. 139 ; p. 110.
73  Jean-François Lyotard, L’inhumain. Causeries sur le temps, Paris 1988, p. 129; Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman. 
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